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Abstract
In rhetoric, China has insisted on the principle of non-intervention 
in the domestic affairs of other countries but, when participating in the 
United Nations, has demonstrated that its non-intervention policy is 
flexible. The disjuncture of word and deed, of policy pronouncements 
and actual diplomatic behavior, can be explored by examining China’s 
attitude and behavior toward international sanctions in the United 
Nations Security Council [UNSC]. Although China remains skeptical 
about coercive measures authorized by the UNSC, it has been open to 
certain sanctions. China’s approval of any given sanctions depends on 
the country’s adherence to the international consensus. The principle 
of non-intervention gives rise to Chinese concerns about the conditions 
for imposing sanctions. This article posits three situations of Chinese 
concerns about these conditions, which result in the country’s response 
to affirm, to abstain from, and to veto, UNSC sanctions.
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Introduction
A belief in absolute sovereignty has meant that China has long insisted on the 
principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. This concept 
presents a dilemma for Chinese leaders who conceive foreign policy from 
contradictory imperatives. During the last decade, China has undoubtedly become 
a rising power in the international arena. It has declared its intention to engage 
proactively in international affairs, thereby gaining a reputation as a responsible 
power that fulfills its obligations to the international community. However, it 
is unlikely that a country can remain completely isolated from participation in 
the contemporary international system with its high degree of interdependence, 
thereby making absolute non-intervention inevitable. Moreover, intervention in 
certain circumstances is justified as a necessary method or a last resort to deal 
with domestic and international problems. Hence, China’s pronouncement of the 
non-intervention principle belies its motivation to exercise diplomatic influence 
in the international system. It is plausible that China poses intransigence toward 
external interventions and refrains from interference in other countries’ domestic 
affairs,1) but Beijing’s attitudes and behavior toward international intervention 
are flexible,2) especially its participation within international organizations. 
Hence, it is worth analyzing China’s non-intervention policy by its reactions to 
international interventions.
This article focuses on China’s diplomatic behavior regarding the non-
intervention principle through the country’s participation in international 
sanctions in the UNSC. Firstly, the UNSC is an appropriate vehicle to examine 
China’s non-intervention policy since it provides a universally recognized 
forum for mandating interventions, wherein approved interventions, which are 
sometimes controversial, usually embody the perspectives of different countries. 
As one of the five permanent members [P5] of the UNSC with veto power, China 
is privileged to use the UNSC as a mechanism to manifest ideas on the rights 
and limitations of international conduct and to block certain interventionist 
proposals. Undeniably, the UN framework has proved inadequate and ineffective 
when confronting some issues that threaten international peace and security. 
Regional organizations or individual countries have bypassed the UNSC and 
 1) This does not mean that China has never engaged in interventionist activities.
 2) This article adopts the definition of international intervention argued by Gene Lyons and Michael 
Mastanduno (1995, p.12) that it may be understood as the crossing of borders and infringements of 
sovereignty carried out by, or in the name of, the international community.
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conducted military interventions in Iraq, Kosovo, as well as Afghanistan, etc. 
From China’s perspective, however, only those interventions authorized by the 
UNSC have legitimacy. Furthermore, China has begun to play an active role 
in the international community to project itself as a responsible power, but its 
opinions of disapproval have hardly affected interventionist actions beyond 
the UN framework.3) Therefore, studying China’s behavior at the UN could 
demonstrate how the non-intervention principle influences China’s involvement 
in international organizations and international interventions.
Secondly, UNSC sanctions are a critically interventionist institution under 
the UN apparatus.4) It is considered an important tool in the maintenance and 
restoration of international peace and security (UNSC, 2006, June 22). Essentially 
coercively interventionist, sanctions logically conflict not only with the principle 
of state sovereignty but also with the principle of non-intervention on which the 
Chinese government intransigently insists, at least at the verbal level. Although 
UNSC sanctions are not taken as a violation to the norm of non-intervention 
and are thus generally accepted by the members of international community,5) 
the Chinese government has firmly articulated that an act of coercion and 
isolation is counterproductive in gaining the cooperation of targeted countries. 
Moreover, one of the legitimate roles of the UNSC is that its authorization 
may bring a sine qua non of major powers’ intervention since the P5 countries 
are capable of steering or capturing sanctions to meet their particular foreign 
policy objectives, which may or may not match the goals of the broader UN 
community6) (Cortright & Lopez, 2000, p. 6). Hence, China’s reactions to UNSC 
sanctions could be investigated to determine the extent to which the Chinese 
government implements the non-intervention policy to resist or comply with the 
 3) The UN is important to China, and possible reasons have been discussed by Kim (1999) and Tieh 
(2004). China’s White Paper on Peaceful Development specifies that it is important to give full play 
to the UN’s role in maintaining world peace and security and in establishing a fair and effective 
mechanism for upholding common security (Information Office of the State Council, September, 
2011).
 4) Although the term, sanction, is not explicitly written in the UN Charter, the Chapter empowers the 
Security Council to order any combination of non-military measures against a wrongdoer. In Article 
41 of Chapter VII, the Security Council may decide what measures, not involving the use of armed 
force, are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the 
United Nations to apply such measures.
 5) Even the US wants to use the Security Council to apply sanctions against specific states as sanctions 
bear the diplomatic appeal of being “international” rather than “US- imposed”.
 6) This does not mean that the P5 members do not constrain themselves from pursuing their objectives 
irrespective of international norms. It only provides a possibility that P5 countries could take 
advantage of the UNSC to serve their own interests.
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international community.
Prior research focusing specifically on this area is rare, and only a small 
subset of comprehensive studies across different issue areas has been conducted. 
Zhao Tong (2010) compared China’s historical experiences as a sanction target 
and as a sanction initiator and thus argued that China has been much more open 
to using or threatening to use tactical sanctions in its own practice. In terms 
of degrees of sanctions, Zhao provided an inspiring perspective from which 
to examine China’s behavior toward sanctions by dividing sanctions into two 
categories, namely, strategic and tactical sanctions. However, Zhao only focused 
on unilateral economic sanctions imposed by China and paid little attention to 
China’s behavior toward international sanctions. It is difficult to define whether 
sanctions employed by the UNSC are strategic or tactical. There are some 
previous works on Chinese foreign policy toward specific countries, such as Iran 
and North Korea, with respect to sanctions.7) These works presumed that Chinese 
foreign policies was in opposition to other Western countries, in particular, the 
US, which fails to capture the full picture of China’s behavior in the UNSC.
This article addresses this academic oversight and examines China’s attitude 
and behavior toward international sanctions by discussing these questions: (1) 
given that China has been cautious and skeptical about adopting sanctions as 
an effective method of achieving UNSC targets, why was it relatively open to 
certain international sanctions in practice? (2) Under what conditions was China 
inclined to endorse sanctions instead of other approaches? (3) Why has China 
decided to vote in different ways - e.g., affirmation, abstention, or veto- regarding 
certain issues? This article is constructed as follows. The first section analyzes 
China’s votes on sanctions-related resolutions in the UNSC. The second section 
evaluates the implications of China’s responses to international sanctions. In 
some cases of unanimous international consensus, China has relinquished the 
non-intervention principle entirely and has chosen a compromise to international 
sanctions. But its concerns on the non-use of force, reasonable intentions, and 
promising prospects of specific cases can be seen as China’s resistance to UNSC 
sanctions. This section then lists three situations in which China’s decisions 
on international sanctions have varied. The following section moves to case 
studies in which China’s decisions relating to international sanctions on Libya, 
North Korea, and Zimbabwe prove the presumptions of the preceding section. 
The conclusion provides an overview of the flexibility of Chinese attitudes and 
 7) See the relevant works of Song (2011), Kemenade (2010) as well as Djallil (2011).
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behavior toward international sanctions in various situations and outlines further 
research by the author.
I. Chinese attitudes and behavior toward UNSC 
sanctions
China generally emphasizes its concerns about sanctions as a method, but 
it has seldom exerted its veto power to alter the original sanctions-imposing 
proposals. China has had a relatively positive attitude toward sanctions-related 
resolutions since entering the UNSC. In the 21st century, the UNSC has passed 
178 sanctions-related resolutions, of which, China supported 170 and abstained 
from eight. During this period, China cast fewer abstention votes than it did in 
the entire decade of the 1990s, though it used the veto four times. (See Table 1)
Table 1: Chinese Sanctions-related Votes in the UNSC in the Post- War Era
Years Aye Abstention Veto
1990–1999 78 20 0
2000–2009 133 5 1
2010–2013.04 37 3 3
Sources: Official Document System [ODS] of the United Nations; UN Bibliographic 
Information System [UNBISnet]; UN Security Council Sanctions Committees.
During this period, negative votes by China, which consisted of abstentions 
and vetoes, were closely associated with sanctions against countries in the 
regions of Africa and the Middle East, including Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea, 
Libya, Zimbabwe, and Syria. (See Table 2) Abstentions are used for more than 
simply sideline expressions of neutrality. China’s abstentions could be seen as 
dissenting from other Western countries in the UNSC and as expressions of 
China’s preferences, perspectives, or even its attitude in the face of international 
pressure.
It appears that Chinese abstentions and vetoes have been cast against 
resolutions targeting states in which China has broad interests. Accordingly, 
James Traub (2006) argued in the New York Times Magazine that China used its 
power to “protect abusive regimes with which it is on friendly terms,” and that 
“China is prepared to play the role of spoiler” on issues discussed in the UNSC. 
Similar judgments of Chinese assertiveness have prevailed in the Western media 
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as well as academia.8) Consequently, China has been portrayed as an anti-status 
quo power that pushes back against Western countries. To some extent, these 
arguments are partly true and convincible because China has agreed with the 
sanctions against those countries, such as Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, with 
which China itself has relatively loose economic or military connections.
Table 2: Chinese Negative Votes on Sanctions-Related Resolutions (2000- present)
Terms Date Purpose Resolution No. Vote Objection
Afghanistan-
Taliban
Dec. 19, 
2000
Imposes arms embargo on 
Taliban in Afghanistan 1333 13,0,2 CP (sanctions)
Sudan, issues 
of Darfur
July 30, 
2004
Imposes arms embargo on 
Darfur region in Sudan 1556 13,0,2 CP (sanctions)
Mar. 29, 
2005
Extends sanctions on 
Darfur region in Sudan 
for failure to comply with 
previous resolutions
1591* 12,0,3 CP (sanctions)
Apr. 25, 
2006
Imposes sanctions toward 
officers in Sudan 1672* 12,0,3 CP (sanctions)
Oct. 14, 
2010
Imposes arms embargo 
against Sudan 1945 14,0,1 Unclear
Zimbabwe July 11, 2008
Imposes economic 
sanctions and arms 
embargo on Zimbabwe
None*
Russian and 
Chinese 
vetoes; 
9,5,1
CP (sanctions)
Somalia and 
Eritrea
Oct. 13, 
2009
Imposes comprehensive 
sanctions on Eritrea 1907 13,1,1 CP (sanctions)
Oct. 5, 
2011
Imposes arms embargo 
against Eritrea 2023* 13,0,2 CP (sanctions)
Libya Mar. 17, 2011
Establishes a ban on 
flights in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya airspace
1973* 10,0,5 CP (use of force)
Syria
Oct. 4, 
2011
Imposes arms embargo on 
Syria None*
Russian and 
Chinese 
vetoes; 
9,2,4
CP (sanctions); TI
Feb. 4, 
2012
Threatens to use further 
measures to Syria None*
Russian and 
Chinese 
vetoes; 
13,0,2
CP (measures to 
put pressure to 
Syria); TI
July 19, 
2012
Threatens to impose 
sanctions to Syria None*
Russian and 
Chinese 
vetoes; 
11,2,2
CP (sanctions); TI
 8) For example, see Swaine (2010) and Small (2010).
China’s Non-intervention Policy in UNSC Sanctions in the 21st Century: The Cases of Libya, North Korea, and Zimbabwe   (Ren)2014】 107
Sources: ODS; UNBISnet
Note1: “Purpose” describes only the aspects of the proposal relevant to sanctions; some are 
omnibus proposals that also deal with other subjects, such as peacekeeping. The resolution 
with * means both of China and Russia cast the negative votes.
Note2: Vote is written as “aye, veto, and abstention.”
Note3: Objections: CP= measure in question would be counter-productive; CS= principled 
stand on invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter; NA= the UNSC is not appropriate venue 
for settling problem in question; TI= does not respect territorial integrity/ sovereignty.
In terms of its voting record, however, it is difficult to infer that China’s 
passive responses to all these cases associated with pariah countries are for 
its own benefit in the UNSC. In other words, the judgment that China is on 
the opposite end in relation to Western countries in the UNSC only considers 
confirming evidences while ignoring disconfirming examples. First, the states 
targeted after the year 2000 in Figure 1 are not economically important to China, 
except for Iran and Sudan whose resource exports take up a large part of China’s 
bilateral trade.
Figure1: The Shares of Bilateral Values of Targeted States in China’s Foreign Trade 
(2000–2011)
Source: National Bureau of Statistical of China (2001–2012).
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Furthermore, China had varied interests in these countries. Table 3 roughly 
depicts the economic and military relationships between China and the targeted 
states. China transferred large-scale weapons to Iran and Sudan but had lesser or 
no recorded transactions of arms with Zimbabwe, Eritrea, North Korea, Syria, 
etc. The scale of China’s economic trade with Iran, Sudan, North Korea, Libya 
and Syria at the time of the sanctions was larger than those with Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC] and Zimbabwe.
China favored sanctions that targeted countries that were economically and 
strategically important to it, such as North Korea and Iran. On the other hand, 
China did not completely support the punitive measures on the states that were 
seemingly unbeneficial to it, e.g., Eretria. Material interests are, therefore, not 
the single motivation for China’s negative voting in the UNSC to protect specific 
countries.9) As the second largest economy in the world, China has economic 
partners spread all over the world, and therefore, few countries are of no benefit 
to mercantilist China. Besides, Chinese disagreements on specific issues are 
not a new phenomenon; the rate of its abstentions in the 2000s and thereafter, 
as it has been seen as a rising and assertive power, has been far lower than 
that of the 1990s. Since material interests fail to explain all Chinese actions 
relating to UNSC sanctions, other factors underlying the votes that influence 
China’s decision-making, as well as the situations in which China has specific 
preferences, need to be investigated.
Table 3: China’s Economic and Military Relations with Targeted States (2000–2013)
Country Years
Bilateral 
trade (first 
instance) 
(US$ 
10,000)
Bilateral 
trade 
(end or in 
2011)
Arms transfers (during or 
before the sanctions)
Rate of TIV 
of arms 
exports 
from 
China (first 
instance)
Rate of TIV 
of arms 
exports 
from China 
(1990- 
2012)
Sierra 
Leone
1997-
2010
409 
(1997)
10,912 
(2010)
Patrol craft; Type- 83 
122mm towed gun (2006 
and 2010 delivery)
2% 0.11%
Eritrea and 
Ethiopia
2000-
2001
5,857 
(2000)
8,057 
(2001) No record No record No record
DRC 2003-present
5,166 
(2003)
398,721 
(2011)
APC (2007 delivery); 
ZFB-05 (2009 delivery) No record 0.01%
 9) For instance, China has a larger economic interests in Iran than in Syria. China did not obstruct 
sanctions against Iran, while it had cast vetoes on sanctions against Syria.
China’s Non-intervention Policy in UNSC Sanctions in the 21st Century: The Cases of Libya, North Korea, and Zimbabwe   (Ren)2014】 109
Liberia 2003-present
6,814 
(2003)
500,793 
(2011) No record No record No record
Sudan 2004-present
252,176 
(2004)
1,153,615 
(2011)
Tank (2003 delivery); 
aircraft (2004 delivery); 
IFV (2004 delivery); 
portable SAM (2005 
delivery)
1.54% 3.16%
Côte 
d’Ivoire
2004-
present
23,147 
(2004)
70,273 
(2011) No record No record No record
North 
Korea
2006-
present
170,009 
(2006)
564,149 
(2011)
Towed MRL (1964–
1990); APC (1972–1992); 
Type-6633 (1973–1995); 
portable SAM (1985–
1994)
No record 1.96%
Iran 2006-present
1,444,741 
(2006)
4,510,340 
(2011)
Anti-ship missiles, IFVs, 
portable SAMs (various 
types, delivery dates and 
quantities)
8.67% 11.84%
Zimbabwe None 28,131 (2008)
87,437 
(2011)
K-8 combat ac (2006 
delivery) No record 0.32%
Eritrea 2009-present
3,992 
(2009)
14,903 
(2011) No record No record 0.05%
Libya 2011-present
278,395 
(2011)
Not 
applicable No record No record No record
Syria None 244,640 (2011)
Not 
applicable
Air search radar (2010 
delivery) No record 0.11%
Sources: National Bureau of Statistical of China(2001–2012); SIPRI Arms Transfer 
Database.
Note: The targets, which are non-states, are not included in this table. These abbreviations 
of weapons can be found at URL <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html>.
II. Implications of China’s responses to the sanctions
It is notable that due to its weak position among the P5, China has never 
been an agenda-setter within the UNSC. Its behavior at the UN can be seen 
as a responsive engagement. China seldom hinders sanctions-related initiatives, 
but it has a relatively low level of convergence with the other four members, 
especially with the Western group, including the US, France, and the UK. 
The disagreements are mainly concentrated on the incongruity between the 
coercive measures advocated by Western countries in the name of maintaining 
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international order and the foreign policy principles to which China has adhered.
A. Conceding to the international community
China’s support for the principle of absolute sovereignty, which comprises 
the equality of sovereign states, non-intervention, and mutual respect for the 
integrity of territoriality and sovereignty, has affected Beijing’s behavior at 
the UN. Beijing’s insistence on these principles is based on a state-centered 
ontology, which highlights the security of countries in the international system 
rather than the security of individuals in international society. In the case of 
paramount state sovereignty, if an agenda is to become a necessary act, it must 
be supported by legitimate reasons on the basis of state consent, normally 
constituting the requirements of the power proposing it and the demands of other 
states approving it. Therefore, China’s approval of specific UNSC sanctions 
to some extent reveals that Beijing compromises on its principle and interests 
in international order, thereby benefiting the majority of the UNSC member 
states.10)
The Chinese government has supported the majority of the international 
sanctions in the UNSC, but it generally does not rhetorically approve coercive 
measures imposed on sovereign states. China’s behavior demonstrates that it 
recognizes that when one country must be subjected to international intervention 
on the basis of international consensus, the sacredness of sovereignty must be 
subordinate to the demand of international order. At the international level, 
China admits that the UNSC has legitimate power to employ international 
sanctions on behalf of the international community.11) However, this does not 
mean that sanctions are the most appropriate measures in Chinese worldview. 
China considers that sanctions should be applied with prudence and under the 
precondition that all peaceful means have been exhausted (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China [CFM], 2005). In addition, the UN 
must set strict criteria and explicit time limits for the sanctions mechanism and 
should minimize the possibility of humanitarian crisis arising from sanctions and 
 10) Avoiding possible isolation or condemnation, the impact of transformation of international norms as 
well as moral judgments possibly propel China’s compliance.
 11) Article 2(7) of the UN Charter provides that enforcement under Chapter VII overrides domestic 
jurisdiction. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require Members 
to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice 
the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
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its impact on other countries. China’s hesitant attitude toward sanctions exhibits 
its concerns about the apropos conditions and methods to implement sanctions.
Non-use of force
To maintain international order, China has a preference for political 
negotiation and coordination as opposed to using coercive measures against 
targeted states; this preference is based on China’s belief in non-interference 
combined with its commitment to mutual respect of the integrity of territoriality 
and sovereignty. As a consequence, China hesitates to support resolutions 
that permit the use of armed force by the UNSC or other organizations. The 
UN Charter defines international sanctions as a punitive measure without 
the use of force, but the contents of some sanctions imply the possibility of 
military action, illustrative in its authorization of states “to take all necessary 
measures”. Regarding the principle of non-use of force, China advocates that the 
Security Council is the only authorizing organ on the use of force and regional 
arrangements or organizations must obtain UNSC authorization prior to any 
enforcement action (CFM, 2005). Nevertheless, UNSC authorization on the use 
of force is based on the consent of the SC members. From China’s perspective, 
the use of force is a last resort measure and should not be imposed as long as 
alternatives exist. Hence, China is inclined to carry on a continuous dialogue 
aimed at convincing targeted states to accept UNSC intervention in managing 
conflicts, and it also pursues resolutions by the UNSC with the consent of the 
governments of targeted states. In short, China is cautious about advocating a 
draft on the use of force without the consent of targeted states or the unanimous 
approval of all UNSC members and other stakeholders.
Reasonable intentions
China’s insistence on the effective control of absolute sovereignty affects 
its interpretation of international intervention, which relies on justification and 
reasonable intention. China acknowledges the legitimacy of the UNSC, but does 
not take this regime as an impartial forum, since international consensus comes 
from individual states that naturally pursue their own interests. China is hesitant 
to associate itself with traditional Western countries and remains skeptical about 
the latter’s underlying intentions and the actual benefits from international 
interventions. China continually denounces that some Western countries force 
other countries to follow their value and political systems. Particular countries 
may use the authorized UNSC intervention to topple a local government and to 
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acquire the targeted state’s obedience or compliance. Therefore, regime change 
is China’s gravest concern, especially given that the so-called intervention might 
be an excuse by a certain country that might be taking advantage of civilian 
protection or international order to change the troublesome regime of a targeted 
state.
Promising prospects
China favors cooperation with governments of targeted states that are seen 
as legitimate representatives of the population in addressing domestic issues. 
Sanctions can be limited pressure serving as a political signal that compels the 
targeted state to reconsider its policies, especially if combined with inducements 
and opportunities for progress through dialogue. China continues to oppose harsh 
sanctions aimed at forcing policy changes by inflicting injury to a country’s 
economy and the livelihood of the people. China has different criteria and 
principles toward international issues from that of Western countries. Beijing 
even applies a strict criterion on the emerging norm “Responsibility to Protect”12) 
in order to avoid military intervention that may derive from the vested interests 
of a particular country or to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe.
B. China’s decisions on UNSC sanctions: three situations
China conveys its views and concerns on different cases through its votes 
on UNSC sanctions-related proposals. Various factors, or combinations thereof, 
affect China’s responses to sanctions, including compromising of international 
consensus, China’s role and interest, issue area, concerns about non-intervention 
principle, etc. As intricate as it might be, there are three basic situations that 
summarize the record of Chinese votes on sanctions, through which one can 
assess the conditions under which China is willing to make a compromise or 
resist international intervention.
Situation 1: International consensus has been reached, but China does 
not play an important role in addressing the target’s problem. Under these 
conditions, China tends to concede to the proposal on sanctions.
China’s assessment of whether the contents of sanctions contradict its non-
intervention principle yields two outcomes: affirmation or abstention. In this 
 12) China officially states that any response to a massive humanitarian crisis should strictly conform to 
the UN Charter and the opinion of the country and the regional organization concerned should be 
respected. The action should lead to a peaceful solution (CFM, 2005).
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situation, the targeted state is usually not located in a pivotal geographic zone, 
which means that a sanction against the targeted state will not threaten regional 
and international stability. If sanctions are proved to be a necessary method and do 
not involve military means, China has no reason to block the sanctions that have 
been approved by the major powers and other stakeholders. Few countries like 
to become involved in the affairs of another country that is geopolitically distant 
and does not serve their strategic and economic interests. Furthermore, China 
might lack diplomatic leverage to mediate the crisis. In this context, the non-
intervention principle is never the normative reason for restraining international 
intervention, which was evident in China’s response to the sanctions against 
Serra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Ethiopia, etc.
On the other hand, China is inclined to cast an abstention when taking 
sanctions does not coincide with the non-intervention principle. Abstention 
signals China’s opposition to interference in the internal affairs of sovereign 
states, while allowing Beijing to avoid alienating allies and the wider international 
community (Shichor, 2006). The non-intervention principle is technically used 
as China’s explanation for abstentions. This excuse may obscure China’s real 
intentions, but in consequence, China concedes its interests by participating 
and addressing international issues. China’s abstentions to the sanctions against 
Afghanistan, Libya, and Ethiopia and Eritrea arguably reflect its struggle with 
balancing its foreign policy principles and its international behavior.
Situation 2: China’s diplomatic efforts in persuading a targeted state’s 
cooperation are ineffective. Beijing thus minimizes the negative outcome before 
the sanctions are put on the agenda in the UNSC.
With respect to the countries with which China has strong economic or 
strategic interests, Beijing can play an important role in mediating between the 
targeted state and the sanctions-initiating countries. In order to guarantee the 
approval of the sanction, the P5 and other stakeholders communicate with each 
other to maintain formal unity before the draft resolution is discussed in the 
UNSC. When the coercive measure has been proved as the last resort, and is 
strongly advocated by the international community, China may seek international 
concessions by negotiations with great powers, or threaten to use its veto power, 
to moderate a harsh draft. If China succeeds, a watered-down resolution can 
thereafter be presented to the Council, which is a way of reducing the risk of 
losses suffered by both the targeted state and China. The relevant sanctions 
against Iran and North Korea are appropriate examples. If not, China may cast 
an abstention. Chinese votes on the issues concerning Sudan are cases in point.
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Situation 3: When the international community has not reached a consensus, 
China is disposed to pursue the Sino-Russian convergence.
If the P5 cannot reach consensus on a resolution, they may choose to 
adopt a presidential statement [PRST] or other measures that are non-binding 
in international law, which constitute less radical changes in existing regimes. 
Under conditions of international dissent, China pursues similar political stands 
as Russia. As Russian foreign minister stressed, in the global context, Russia 
and China are close partners in the UNSC (Lavrov, 2012, December 9). In some 
cases, the targeted states are of more strategic significance to Russia than to 
China. China historically concentrates on its existence in East Asia. Conflict-
affected regions like the Middle East and Africa are not within China’s security 
concerns. Russia and other Western countries traditionally compete with each 
other for maintaining their power presence in these regions. When Russia and 
other Western countries encounter divergence regarding a targeted state, China 
often sides with Russia since it is also skeptical of the real intentions of Western 
countries.
China is reluctant to use its veto power, but it has cast vetoes on some 
sanctions that yield no benefits to Beijing. A compelling convergence in veto 
employment exists between China and Russia. Using Syria as an example, the 
Security Council started addressing the issue of Syria when it was still knee-deep 
in the quagmires of Libya. It provided China with a good pretext that measures 
against Syria might repeat Libya’s tragedy. It was reasonable that chronological 
subsequence was a factor in China’s concern with the problem. However, while 
China acquiesced in the sanction on Libya, it vetoed the proposal of sanctions 
against Syria, which was a less significant partner than Libya for the Chinese 
government. China and Russia coordinately proposed a draft resolution and 
formed a group sharing the same political stand regarding Syria. By acting in 
concert with Russia, China not only expresses its concerns about the tension 
between its foreign policy principles and the normative reasons for international 
order, but also takes no responsibility in obstructing international actions for its 
own stake.
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Table 4: Descriptive Factors of Situations
Situation International consensus Chinese role
International 
concession Russia’s attitude Principle
1 Strong Weak Inapplicable Conditional Conditional
2 Strong Strong Conditional Considered Weak
3 Weak Conditional No Considered Strong
Note1: International consensus is categorized into two groups, strong and weak, which 
respectively represent sanctions that have not been vetoed by all member states of the 
UNSC, and have been vetoed by at least one P5 member or stakeholders associated with 
the specific issue.
Note2: “Inapplicable” means that the factor did not exist or was not considered in that 
situation. “Conditional” means that the factor shows different possibilities in specific cases; 
in some cases that factor may be contributing but is not the determinant.
III. Case Studies
China’s reactions to UNSC sanctions are analyzed with respect to the cases 
of the Libyan humanitarian crisis caused by the government’s use of force to 
suppress protests, North Korea’s missiles and nuclear program, and Zimbabwe’s 
election violence. All these cases are related to the issue of UNSC sanctions in 
the twenty-first century, but China has different corresponding responses. It is 
meaningful to investigate these cases based on proposed situations and to clarify 
their characteristics and the patterns of Chinese responses. Hence, the cases are 
designed to assess the situations in which China acceded to UNSC sanctions and 
what factors were of concern to China and affected its decisions. The three cases 
represent various issue areas and are not only important on the UNSC agenda 
but are also typical in China’s foreign policy since they are all associated with 
China’s non-intervention policy and are important concerns for China. The case 
of Libya was promoted as a UNSC proposal by regional organizations and some 
P5 members. It involved the question of UNSC positions on issues of human 
rights abuse, China’s dilemma between humanitarian intervention favored by 
the international community and its non-intervention principle, and Beijing’s 
concerns about using military force. The case of North Korea in the UNSC is 
a significant issue concerning missile launches and nuclear programs, which 
pose a threat to regional and international stability and security. It involves 
China’s balancing between self-interest and international order. The case of 
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Zimbabwe was promoted as a UNSC agenda item by the US and did not result in 
international consensus. It involved China’s negative attitude toward the UNSC 
agenda relating to issues of civil and political rights and Beijing’s veto for other 
countries’ interests.
Case 1: The Libyan conflicts (2011)
The Libyan crisis is a direct consequence of the Arab Spring, referring to the 
democratic uprisings that arose and spread across the Arab World in 2010–2011. 
In February 2011, the former Libyan colonel Muammar Gaddafi chose a robust 
response to the protest movement by not only describing the anti-government 
civilians as “cockroaches” but also declaring war on the Libyan uprising. 
Soon, more than a thousand protestors were killed. After the Gaddafi forces 
gained the territory of Benghazi, which was at the epicenter of the rebellion, a 
mass cleansing of the discontented population was foreseen. In response to the 
rapidly strenuous situation and the possible humanitarian crisis, the UN initiated 
interventions in a series of condemning statements, and the UNSC passed seven 
sanctions-related resolutions.
Table 5: Voting in the UNSC on Sanctions against Libya
Resolution 1970 1973 2009 2016 2017 2040 2095
Main Objects Sanctions Sanctions UN PKF Sanctions terminated
UN 
Monitoring UN PKF UN PKF
Votes 15,0,0 10,5,0 15,0,0 15,0,0 15,0,0 15,0,0 15,0,0
Grouping 
corresponding 
with the US 
views
11 10 - - - - -
Grouping 
corresponding 
with China 
views
2 4 - - - - -
Grouping 
corresponding 
with other 
views
2 1 - - - - -
Sources: Odgaard (2013, p.33) the items of Resolution 1973 adjusted by author UN; UNSC 
(2013).
Note: Voting is written as “aye, abstention, veto”. PKF stands for Peace-keeping Force. 
Member states are grouped according to their statements following their UNSC votes on 
resolutions.
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Regarding these resolutions, China cast several votes, which exhibited the 
country’s concerns and priorities. China did not oppose draft Resolution 1970, 
which imposed sanctions against Libya, and even abstained rather than blocked 
the more severe sanctions contained in Resolution 1973, which established a no-
fly zone over Libya and all necessary measures to protect civilians from attacks 
by forces led by Gaddafi. This case is unique because the sanctions implied the 
potential of using force and the Western target of overthrowing the then regime, 
which lay at the heart of China’s foreign policy principles.
China had extensive ties with Libya before the Libyan conflict broke 
out; there were more than 50 Chinese investment programs in Libya, mainly 
infrastructure and oil programs. In his first official visit to Libya in April 2002, 
the former Chinese president, Jiang Zemin, signed agreements, which included 
a $ 40 million deal for a Chinese company to extend Libya’s rail network and a 
Libyan commitment to open its hydrocarbon sector to Chinese firms (St John, 
2008). Before the UNSC lifted the sanctions against Libya in September 2003, 
Chinese oil companies vigorously entered the Libyan crude oil market and the 
China Petroleum Pipeline started the program of construction of oil and gas 
pipelines in Western Libya (Wang, 2007, p. 47). The bombing of Libya placed 
Chinese investments, worth billions of dollars along with the lives of 35,860 
Chinese nationals working in Libya, at risk. According to the report of the 
Ministry of Commerce, the full value of China’s engagement with Libya was 
attacked on at least 27 Chinese construction projects, resulting in a 45% fall 
in contract projects (Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China 
[MOC], 2012). Although Libyan oil imports were attractive to China, they only 
accounted for three percent of Chinese oil imports before the crisis (China 
Industrial Map Editorial Committee; China Economic Monitoring and Analysis 
Center, 2013, p. 65), which did not provide a sufficient reason for China to help 
Gaddafi in the UNSC. Furthermore, China could not play a role in mediating the 
discrepancies between the Libyan government and other stakeholders.
From a Chinese perspective, the consent of the international community 
provided the necessary backing for the UNSC’s decisive actions. In the Libyan 
case, the views of regional stakeholders, including the Arab and African 
organizations, were taken into account. Between February 20 and February 
23, the Security Council of the League of Arab States, the Secretary- General 
of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation [PIC] and the Peace and Security 
Council of the African Union [AUPSC] all issued statements condemning 
Libya’s descent into violence; the Arab League subsequently went a step further 
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and suspended Libya’s membership of the League (UNSC, 2011, February 22; 
OIC, 2011, February 22; AUPSC, 2011, February 23). Former Chinese Foreign 
Ministry spokeswoman, Jiang Yu, expressed Chinese opinions on the principles 
behind the Libya crisis during a regular press conference on March 03, 2011; she 
emphasized that “The UNSC should pay attention to and respect the opinions 
of the Arab and African countries (Huanqiu Net, 2011)”. On July 21, Former 
Chinese President Hu Jintao communicated with the President of South Africa 
and acknowledged the important role that South Africa and the AU had played in 
the political resolution of the Libyan issue, which showed the determination of 
African countries to solve an African issue in an African way. He stated, “China 
highly appreciates your efforts and would like to maintain close consultation and 
coordination on the Libyan issue” (Reuters, 2011). In addition to the regional 
organizations, other countries supported the resolution against Libya, which led 
to a guarantee of China’s affirmative vote for Resolution 1970. Li Baodong, 
China’s UN representative, highlighted the safety of foreign nationals in remarks 
at the UNSC meeting. Li urged the immediate end of violence to restore stability 
“to avoid future bloodshed and civilian causalities,” and “the safety and interests 
of the foreign nationals in Libya must be assured” in the process. Under the 
condition of international consensus, China supported the punitive measures 
against Libya and rhetorically underlined the emergency of protecting human 
rights.
Regarding Resolution 1973, while China abstained, it virtually acquiesced 
to the military intervention by allowing the passage of the resolution. With the 
escalation of the Libyan crisis, Western countries considered a more serious 
and effective measure to combat it. The US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
conferred in Paris with European leaders on the possibility of establishing a 
no fly-zone over Libya as a means to addressing the unrest. A week before the 
discussion on Resolution 1973, the Arab League stated its support for a no-
fly zone (IBTimes, 2011). Resolution 1973 shared the same intention with 
Resolution 1970, that is, humanitarian aid, which regional stakeholders had 
advocated. Although China was concerned that the approval of the use of 
military force in Resolution 1973 would contradict its principles, it decided 
against the veto because of the endorsement of sanctions associated with the 
use of military force from the AU and the Arab League (UNSC, 2011, March 
17). Notwithstanding, China was still cautious about the military measures 
and thus abstained from Resolution 1973. After the resolution was passed, Li 
Baodong explained, “The state sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial 
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integrity of Libya should be respected and the peaceful means should be used 
as the priority option to resolve the Libyan issue”. He added that in handling 
international relations, “China has remained opposed to the use of military 
force. Many problems remain un-clarified and un-answered. Thus, China found 
serious difficulties with some parts of the resolution” (Permanent Mission of the 
PRC to the UN, 2011). Some Chinese scholars argued that the pace of the events 
in Libya propelled China’s acquiescence (Duowei Net, 2011). Hence, China’s 
abstention, to some extent, succumbed to demands by other UNSC members.
The other four abstentions were cast by Russia, Brazil, India and Germany. 
Except Germany, the other abstentions were from members of the BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). There was little information on 
whether the countries had reached consensus on the Libyan issue before the draft 
resolution was tabled. However, one month after Resolution 1973 was passed, 
the BRICS meeting opened in China’s Hainan Province. There is a significant 
possibility that the five countries had discussed the Libyan problems at the 
meeting, and it became obvious that the BRICS members did not share the West’s 
enthusiasm for the Arab Spring and saw more troubles than gains ahead, which 
was a follow-up episode responding to the voting record on Resolution 1973 
(The Telegraph, 2012). During the debate on the Libyan issue, the Permanent 
Mission of the PRC to the UN clearly stated, “We oppose any discretionary 
view toward Resolution 1973 and foreign countries purposely overthrowing the 
current regime of a sovereign state or becoming involved in an internal war 
in the name of protecting civilians” (Xinhua News Agency, 2011, May 11). In 
addition, Chinese President Hu expressed his disquiet about the multinational 
coalition’s air attack on Libya, which might have caused additional civilian 
human rights disasters. He once said, if the air attack caused civilians causalities 
in Libya, this would probably breach the original intention of UNSC Resolution 
1973 (Xinhua News Agency, 2011, March 30).
In conclusion, under the condition of international consensus, China chose 
to approve the sanctions embodied in the UNSC resolutions. China approved 
Resolution 1970 since the international community had taken sanctions against 
the Libyan government as an appropriate method to resolve the humanitarian 
crisis. In contrast, China abstained from Resolution 1973 because of the 
possible use of military force. Notwithstanding, Beijing’s emphasis on adhering 
to international norms under the UN Charter was also shared by other UNSC 
members. Therefore, the Libyan case is categorized as situation 1.
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Table 6: Summary of the Libyan Case
Resolution 1970 1973
Chinese response Aye Abstention
International consensus STRONG. Sanctions were unanimously agreed.
STRONG. Without veto, but some 
UNSC members abstained.
Chinese role WEAK. China did not play a role in the Libyan issue.
International concession INAPPLICABLE.
Russia’s attitude INAPPLICABLE CONSIDERED
Principle
WEAK. Restrained non-
intervention principle to 
humanitarian intervention.
STRONG. Opposed the use of force.
Case 2: The North Korean sanctions (2006–2009)
The UNSC intervened in the issues of North Korea eight times in forms 
of PRSTs and resolutions since Pyongyang declared its withdrawal from the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] and started to develop nuclear capability 
in 1993. But the UNSC did not impose sanctions against North Korea until 
Pyongyang launched the Taepodong-2 missile in 2006. Table 7 lists five main 
UNSC sanctions on North Korea. The North Korean crisis reached a deadlock 
when international sanctions had little effect on Pyongyang’s continual missile 
launches and nuclear tests. China’s role in the process of confronting this crisis 
went through a transformation from a passive onlooker to a reticent host and, 
ultimately, a chief mediator (Glaser & Wang, 2008, p. 166). Although critics 
charged that China had indulged North Korea’s provocations, Beijing did make 
an effort to address the nuclear crisis and even supported almost all sanctions 
against Pyongyang. China was concerned about the stability of the Korean 
peninsula due to the geopolitical significance of North Korea. Therefore, China 
tried to avoid the precipitating collapse of the North Korean regime by promoting 
dialogues between Washington, Pyongyang, and other regional stakeholders. As 
North Korea was sensitive to international sanctions,13) the reason for China’s 
approval of these interventions at the expense of stirring Pyongyang’s outrage 
needs to be analyzed.
 13) North Korea viewed the international responses, especially international sanctions imposed by the 
UNSC, as infringing upon its sovereignty and hurting the dignity of the Korean people (Nakato, 
2012).
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Table 7: China Voting on the Main Sanctions against North Korea (2006–2013)
Resolution Date Reason Items
1695 July 15, 2006 Missile launches Embargo of missile-related materials
1718 Oct. 14, 2006 First nuclear test Embargo of missile-related and nuclear-related materials as well as luxury goods
1874 June 12, 2009 Second nuclear test
Widens the embargo of the arms, missile-related 
and nuclear-related materials, WMDs, and 
luxury goods; lays out procedures for conducting 
cargo inspections.
2087 Jan. 22, 2013 Missile launches Imposes measures of Res.1717 and 1874
2094 Mar. 7, 2013 Third nuclear test
Embargo of arms, missile-related and nuclear-
related materials, WMDs, and luxury goods; Ban 
of financial assist; a travel ban; assets freeze.
Source: UN Security Council Sanctions Committees
Weakened Resolution 1695
North Korea launched a series of seven ballistic missiles that landed in 
Japanese territorial waters in July 2006, which cast a shadow over the security 
of North East Asia. The Taepodong-2 rock, one of the missiles, was suspected 
of being capable of reaching the territory of the US. The UNSC consequently 
passed Resolution 1695, which demanded that North Korean suspend all missile-
related programs, and called on member states to exercise vigilance in terms of 
arms transfers to and from North Korea (UNSC, 2006a, July 15). China did 
not block the resolution and made a regular statement that Beijing was gravely 
concerned about the emerging situation on the Korean peninsula and was 
opposed to any further tension (UNSC, 2006b, July 15, p. 5). China originally 
intended to alleviate this crisis.14) A CFM spokesman said in a statement that 
China urged all parties to remain calm and hoped parties would not take actions 
that might complicate the situation (Xinhua News Agency, 2006). Japan and the 
US attempted to exert pressure on North Korea through the UNSC sanction, but 
China, backed by Russia, hoped to propose a PRST following the model of the 
1998 missile tests (The International Herald Tribune, 2006). The UN agreed with 
China’s plan of attending to the North Korean missiles issue through bilateral 
 14) It is notable that one day before the missile test, China released the news of its high-ranking officials’ 
visit to North Korea, during which China would have persuaded Pyongyang to abandon the missile 
launch.
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dialogue (Abramowitz & Lynch, 2006). At the same time, China dispatched 
Wu Dawei, China’s Six Party Talks representative, to Pyongyang on July 8 to 
persuade North Korea to exercise restraint, but he returned to China without 
agreement on July 14.
China reconsidered measures to address the missile test although it had not 
given up on diplomatic negotiation with North Korea during Wu’s visit. One 
important factor was that UNSC members, except China and Russia, had reached 
a consensus on imposing sanctions against North Korea. US ambassador, John 
Bolton, said the Council was making “good progress” on a resolution, backed by 
13 of the 15 council members (Globe and Mail, 2006). On July 10, the P5 and 
Japan convened a meeting to discuss the resolution against North Korea. China 
strongly opposed the Japanese draft but had changed its attitude to a possible 
resolution. The Japan-sponsored draft would have allowed military enforcement 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and would have banned all UN members 
from acquiring North Korean missiles or weapons of mass destruction (Fox News, 
2010). After the meeting, Wang Guangya, the Chinese permanent representative 
to the UN, said that if other member states wanted a resolution, they should have 
a modified one instead of the current one. The following day, China and Russia 
proposed a draft resolution on North Korea in the UNSC, which did not include 
strong measures such as sanctions. Although Japan could not accept this new 
draft, it still made a compromise.15) The second day after Wu’s return from North 
Korea, China ultimately approved the watered-down draft resolution, which did 
not invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter and excluded calling Pyongyang a 
threat. Instead, it called on states to exercise vigilance in their arms transactions 
with North Korea. In this process, China kept the same political stand with 
Russia, but Russia did not play a role in engaging North Korea and followed 
China’s actions. South Korea’s stance, disagreeing on coercive measures,16) on 
North Korean missile testing might have affected China’s behavior in opposing 
the Japan-sponsored draft. Therefore, the international consensus, Japan and 
the US’ compromise, and China’s unsuccessful negotiation with North Korea 
jointly constrained Beijing from wielding its veto power.
 15) Kenzo Oshima, Japanese ambassador to the UN, said in New York that the Chinese-Russian draft 
resolution would be very difficult for Japan to accept (BBC , 2006, July 13).
 16) South Korea’s Roh Moo-hyun administration had a generally moderate stance toward the North.
China’s Non-intervention Policy in UNSC Sanctions in the 21st Century: The Cases of Libya, North Korea, and Zimbabwe   (Ren)2014】 123
Watered-down sanctions under Resolution 1718
Contrary to that of the missile launch crisis, China’s reaction to North 
Korea’s nuclear test was forceful and straightforward. On October 9, the very 
day of North Korea’s second nuclear test, China swiftly issued a statement 
condemning North Korea for defying the international community and calling 
the nuclear test a “flagrant” act (CFM, 2006). The Chinese government had rarely 
applied the Chinese word “hanran,” equivalent to “flagrant,” in its diplomatic 
parlance unless the issues deeply hurt Chinese people’s feeling.17) In addition 
to the wordplay, China was ready to agree to actions against North Korea. 
Wang Guangya responded that there had to be some punitive actions in the 
draft resolution presented to the UNSC by the US on October 9 (BBC, 2006a). 
China had directly and indirectly conveyed its position on denuclearization of 
the Korean peninsula to North Korea, but Pyongyang ignored it. The nuclear test 
became a deep embarrassment and an intolerably grave provocation to China.18) 
China did not send a special envoy to North Korea for negotiation and did not 
submit an alternative draft resolution against Pyongyang.
However, it did not completely uphold the draft resolution proposed by 
the US. The US considered keeping the military option on the table, but China 
did not agree with using military force (Straits Times, 2006). The discrepancy 
between China and the US focused on one provision in the draft resolution - the 
authorization of international inspections of cargo leaving and arriving in North 
Korea to detect weapons-related material. China rejected the revision due to 
a likely escalation of North Korean provocations induced by the inspections. 
In order to dissolve objections from China, the US modified the draft and 
excluded the measure of using military force as well as a blanket arms embargo 
(National Post, 2006). The ultimate resolution passed by the UNSC was more 
severe than Resolution 1695, but it had been watered down and did not include 
economic sanctions. China limited the sanctions to nuclear and missile materials 
transactions because excessive sanctions might have led to the economic 
collapse of North Korea, which gravely concerned China. China’s concern with 
coercive methods toward North Korea seemed rational since the Kim Jong-il 
 17) The Chinese government had only used the word “hanran” to describe the Japanese prime minister’s 
visit to the Yasukuni Shrine and the US bombardment of China’s embassy in Belgrade.
 18) After returning from a two-day trip to China, Chun Yung-woo, South Korea’s chief nuclear envoy, 
explained China’s views and said that China had decided to spearhead efforts for the denuclearization 
of North Korea (BBC, 2006b).
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regime would likely shift the burden of sanctions to the people, resulting in 
an accelerated humanitarian crisis.19) The nature of this crisis, a nuclear test 
undeniably threatening China’s interest, and the unanimous international 
condemnation of North Korea had affected Beijing’s decision. The watered-
down draft resolution, which was in accordance with Chinese views, facilitated 
the approval of Resolution 1718.
Harsher sanctions in Resolution 1874
China was disappointed in North Korea’s second nuclear test on May 25, 
2009, which was depicted by the rhetoric that North Korea had ignored universal 
opposition and that China was resolutely opposed to it (Xinhua News Agency, 
2009). Beijing voted in favor of UNSC Resolution 1874, which included hasher 
sanctions than its precursor. The punitive measure was the only option to deal 
with North Korea’ crisis since North Korea had declared its withdrawal from the 
Six Party Talks, thus signaling the failure of dialogue and negotiation. Similar 
to Resolution 1718, Resolution 1874 did not include implied military measures 
and the content that all states should search North Korean ships suspected of 
carrying illicit cargo, as originally suggested by the US. Nonetheless, both 
resolutions were aimed at prohibiting North Korea from conducting nuclear 
tests or using ballistic missile technology in the future.
Figure 2: China-North Korea Trade 2000–2008
Source: Noland (January,2009, p. 69).
 19) Byman and Lind (2010) analyze the scenario of imposing an economic sanction.
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Resolution 1874 differed from its predecessor on the scope of an embargo 
and the means of enforcing the sanctions. It called on international institutions 
and all UN member states not to undertake new grants and financial assistance 
to North Korea, except for humanitarian purposes. The resolution used the word 
“call on” rather than “require,” and therefore, the compulsivity of the effective 
enforcement was minimized. The flexibility in interpreting the sanctions might 
not have made North Korea more vulnerable (Shen, 2009, p. 179). The main aim 
did not change to an overthrow of the Kim regime, and the sanctions would not 
lead to North Korea’s economic collapse. Besides, based on the consequence of 
previous sanctions, those measures would not have negative impacts on China’s 
economic interests. Figure 2 shows that trade between China and North Korea 
steadily increased since the first sanctions were implemented, and decreases 
in trade that followed the immediate aftermath of the sanctions were normal 
seasonal changes.
Although it was reluctant to use coercive measures against North Korea, 
China compromised on the appeal of the international community. One important 
factor was that the international community had reached a consensus to apply 
sanctions against North Korean provisions, especially after much persuasion did 
not result in North Korea’s cooperation. However, China did not force North 
Korea into a corner and was devoted to acquiring concessions from the US 
and Japan by negotiating or threatening to exert its veto power to minimize the 
damage of relevant draft resolutions. From the Chinese perspective, sanctions 
against North Korea had alerted the latter’s provocations in the condition of 
diplomatic deadlock. Hence, Resolution 1874 and respective resolutions of 2013 
were more symbolic than serious punishment. In short, the North Korean case 
proves situation 2.
Table 8: Summary of the North Korean Case
Resolution 1695 1718 1874
Chinese response China supported watered-down sanctions
International 
consensus
STRONG. Sanctions 
were highly supported 
by the international 
community except China, 
Russia and South Korea.
STRONG. International consensus reached.
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Chinese role STRONG. China made 
an effort to persuade 
North Korea to cooperate 
with the international 
community.
STRONG. China did not continue to persuade North 
Korea because its previous efforts proved ineffective.
International 
concession
YES. The US and Japan agreed to revise original 
sanctions to allow for more moderate ones.
NO. But the sanctions 
originally were limited to 
the non-proliferation of 
missile-related technology 
and nuclear program
Russia’s attitude CONSIDERED. Russia backed China’s stance on North Korea
Principle WEAK. Regional and international stability and security outweighed the non-
intervention principle
Case3: Veto on Zimbabwe (2008)
China, along with Russia, vetoed a draft of sanctions on Zimbabwe’s 
President Robert Mugabe and 13 of his henchmen in the wake of the post-
election political violence. The Zimbabwe issue occurred when China was 
preparing for the Beijing Olympic Games. In order to protect its positive image 
on the international scene, Beijing should have restrained from conflicts with 
most countries and cooperate with the international community to address some 
international issues. However, some scholars have taken China’s material interest 
in Zimbabwe into consideration as a plausible explanation for China’s veto of 
the sanction against Zimbabwe. In 2007, China’s investments in Zimbabwe 
reached $1.6 billion, and Beijing was reportedly Zimbabwe’s second largest 
trading partner and its largest investor (Banya, 2008; Russell, 2007). As one of 
Zimbabwe’s major trading partners and weapon suppliers, China was worried 
that sanctions would affect its exports (Doyle, 2008; Nasaw, 2008). Nevertheless, 
from China’s perspective, economic cooperation with Zimbabwe was not as 
important as other observers argued. Rather, its economic interests in Zimbabwe 
were relatively modest. (See Figure 1 and Table 3) Moreover, there is no record 
that China exported weapons to Zimbabwe after 2008. China seldom wielded its 
veto power to block UNSC resolutions unless they were associated with its core 
interests. The Zimbabwe veto was cast less than one month before the opening 
ceremony of the Olympic Games, which apparently resulted in adverse effects 
on China’s image. Hence, Zimbabwe’s case was peculiar since China’s veto 
departed from the reasonable assumption, and it was also abnormal that China 
had not made a public effort to intervene with the authorities in Zimbabwe.
As early as April 30, when the UNSC discussed whether or not to place the 
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Zimbabwe issue on the agenda, China opposed the inclusion of the issue without 
public justification. On June 23, Beijing supported the UNSC’s PRST condemning 
electoral violence. One day later, the spokesman emphasized China’s desire that 
the parties “resolve their disputes through dialogue and other peaceful means 
to complete their presidential election smoothly” (Chinese News Net, 2008). 
However, Beijing voted against the sanctions in the following month. China’s 
rationale for exercising its veto power to block the draft resolution was that the 
issue was no threat to world stability, and it called upon the council to respect the 
position of African countries on that issue and to allow more time for the good 
offices and mediation efforts of the AU and the Southern African Development 
Community [SADC] (UNSC, 2008, pp. 12–13). Along with China, Russia, 
Libya, South Africa, and Vietnam cast negative votes, and Indonesia abstained.
It is difficult to measure the extent to which China had made an effort, 
through bilateral dialogue or other means, to cope with this crisis as Chinese 
officials consistently supported dialogue among Zimbabweans and hoped they 
could find their own solutions. A week before the vote, the US Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice was in China and tried to get Chinese officials to support 
sanctions against Zimbabwe (The Herald, 2008). Beijing subsequently issued a 
statement, similar to the foregoing, but did not publicly make a promise to support 
the sanctions. Simply saying “no” to that draft resolution would inevitably 
bring discredit to China’s reputation. Nevertheless, Russia, sympathizing with 
Beijing’s position, became the focus of criticism. Russia had been persuaded at 
the G8 summit in Japan to join in condemnation of the Zimbabwe regime. But 
Moscow backpedaled and sabotaged the imposition of sanctions by using its 
veto power, which resulted in angry recrimination. Sir John Sawers, the UK’s 
ambassador to the UN, saw Russia’s veto as an “incomprehensive” action. He 
added that China followed the Russia’s lead and that neither had made any effort 
to discuss the resolution (Nasaw, 2008). Besides, Zalmay Khalilzad, the US 
permanent representative to the UN, also expressed America’s disappointment at 
Russia’s veto and indirectly criticized Russia as having eschewed a contribution 
to addressing the Zimbabwe crisis and delayed the consultation with the excuse 
of presidential absence in Moscow. Regarding China’s veto, his comment was 
short and articulated that China disturbingly joined Russia with the veto (USUN 
Press, 2008). The international community did not expect China to play an 
important role in resolving the Zimbabwe crisis.
Chinese scholars have argued that American and European sanctions on 
Zimbabwe since 2000 had “made an already bad situation much worse” (Zeng 
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& Li, 2007, p. 37).20) China’s response to the Zimbabwe affair was based on 
this kind of conception. Liu Jianchao, the CFM spokesman, said, “Under the 
current circumstances, a resolution on imposing sanctions against Zimbabwe 
will not help the various factions in Zimbabwe to conduct political dialogue and 
negotiations and achieve results. Instead, it will lead to further complications 
in Zimbabwe’s situation” (Xinhua News Agency, 2008a). One explanation for 
China’s veto might have been South Africa’s attitude toward the draft resolution. 
South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki was appointed mediator in March 2007. 
When the political violence broke out in 2008, his role was reaffirmed by SADC, 
and he was mandated to facilitate talks between the rival parties - the ruling party 
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front [ZANU-PF] led by Mugabe 
and the opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change [MDC] founded by 
Morgan Tsvangirai. The Mbkei’s mediation did not proceed smoothly. Tsvangirai 
was skeptical of Mbkei’s role (Bearak, 2008), and Western countries also thought 
Mbkei had deliberately covered up the Mugabe government (Nasaw, 2008). Less 
than one week before the draft resolution was voted, Mugabe agreed to resume 
talks with the MDC, but the conversation did not lead to breakthroughs. South 
Africa thought that the door of negotiation was not yet closed and argued that 
its neighbor was not a threat to world peace. People’s Daily, controlled by the 
Chinese government, asserted that Mbkei-sponsored talks attained preliminary 
results, and thus there was a reason to allow more time before taking punitive steps 
(Pei, July 13, 2008). Wang Guangya conveyed that the situation in Zimbabwe 
was highly complex and sensitive, but the negotiation process was already 
underway, and the resolution of sanctions against Zimbabwe would unavoidably 
interfere with the negotiation process and lead to further deterioration of the 
situation (Xinhua News Agency, 2008b). Regardless of the real motive behind 
China’s veto, the vetoes by Russia and South Africa affected China’s decision. 
In this situation, China had the justifiable reason to emphasize the principles on 
which it insisted and simultaneously avoided the overwhelming condemnation 
of the international community.
Zimbabwe’s political violence had propelled the humanitarian crisis, 
which invoked Western countries’ outcry and engagement. For China, on the 
other hand, it was not rational to get involved in the crisis, even in the context 
of international intervention. Regarding the case of Zimbabwe, although the 
failure of the Mugabe regime’s economic policy had led to a severe economic 
 20) From March 2003, the US commenced unilateral sanctions against Zimbabwe.
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condition and a humanitarian crisis, the Zimbabwe issue, in terms of UNSC 
draft resolutions, was raised by the political tension between the current regime 
and the opposition party. China, adhering to the policy of non-intervention in 
other countries’ domestic affairs, could not interfere, regardless of the human 
rights abuses. On one hand, regional countries might have convinced China that 
negotiations were still promising. On the other hand, in order to attend to this 
domestic crisis, which was geographically far from China, mediation of the 
regional organization seemed be an appropriate medium. China took advantage 
of the Russian and South African vetoes, especially the former, which provided 
China with an opportunity of not compromising to the needs of the international 
community. Thus, the Zimbabwe’s case matches situation 3.
Table 9: Summary of Zimbabwe’s case
Resolution Draft
Chinese response Veto
International consensus WEAK. Western countries agreed with sanctions against Zimbabwe, while 
Russia opposed it along with regional stakeholders’ disapproval.
Chinese role WEAK. China had little political impulse to mediate this issue.
International concession NO. The US did not make concessions.
Russia’s attitude CONSIDERED
Principle STRONG. Non-intervention in other countries’ political affairs.
Conclusion
While China’s rhetoric remains tough in the political realm, its actual 
conduct with respect to the non-intervention principle has softened. China has 
accepted a greater scope of UN interventions, especially in the 21st century. 
With respect to UNSC sanctions, China seldom wields its veto power to 
impede such sanctions although it does not completely approve of imposing 
coercive measures on targeted states. China tries to make balanced decisions 
when the needs of the international community contradict with its foreign 
policy principles in dealing with issues relating to targeted states. From China’s 
perspective, international consensus provides legitimacy to intervention, which 
is essential for international sanctions. Hence, China is more likely to endorse 
sanctions when a broad consensus is reached. When there is a division in this 
respect, the principles of non-use of force, reasonable intention and promising 
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prospects affect its decision-making, especially in terms of calculations about 
the appropriateness of intervention. In such situations, China resists sanctions 
and expresses its concerns by means of abstentions or vetoes.
China’s attitude and behavior toward international sanctions can be 
categorized using three explanations, all of which exhibit Chinese preferences 
and concerns on specific issues. China’s non-intervention principle influences 
its preference for applying moderate measures towards solving international 
and regional crises in the UNSC. However, when means like dialogue or 
negotiation prove ineffective, China concedes to appeals by the international 
community. China’s decisions also depend on its capability of reconciliation 
and negotiation in specific cases. If China plays an important role in addressing 
the crisis of targeted states, it may water-down a draft resolution to minimize 
the negative consequences of the sanctions on targeted states as well as on itself. 
Because of its alienation from the majority of member states in the UNSC, 
when the international community fails to reach a consensus, China pursues a 
convergence of political stands with Russia to avoid isolation or blame. Three 
diverse cases, Libya, North Korea, and Zimbabwe, have been elaborated to test 
these presumptions.
China’s responsive behavior may be, to some degree, incredible, but it also 
demonstrates that it cannot fulfill its promise to be a responsible great power in 
diplomatic practice. China’s attitude and behavior in relation to UNSC sanctions 
provide an appropriate dimension to investigate Chinese foreign policy. 
However, it is only one tiny piece of the jigsaw. Other angles, such as Chinese 
participation in humanitarian intervention, will be scrutinized in order to capture 
a comprehensive understanding on China’s engagement in contemporary 
international society.
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